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*Comp. Law. 90 Introduction
The question for the House of Lords in Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd, Official Receiver v Wadge
Rapps and Hunt 1 was whether the powers conferred by s.236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA”) can
lawfully be exercised solely or principally to obtain evidence for use in disqualification proceedings
under the Company Directors' Disqualification Act 1986 (“CDDA”). It is important to stress that the
question was simply one of jurisdiction : on the application of an administrator, administrative
receiver, liquidator, provisional liquidator or the official receiver does the court have the power to
summon any of the categories of person described in s.236(2) to provide the applicant with
information and/or documents where the information and/or documents are required solely or
principally in connection with disqualification proceedings that are being contemplated or are already
pending?
Facts
The company was ordered to be compulsorily wound up in June 1999, whereupon the official receiver
initially took office as liquidator.2 In fulfilment of his obligation under CDDA, s.7(3)(a), the official
receiver reported to the Secretary of State that, in his view, the conduct of two of the directors was
such as to make them unfit to be concerned in the management of a company for the purposes of
CDDA, s.6(1). The Secretary of State directed the official receiver to commence disqualification
proceedings against the two directors and these were instituted in February 2000. The proceedings
were later transferred to the High Court and the Secretary of State substituted as applicant. Having
ceased to be liquidator on the appointment of a licensed insolvency practitioner in June 1999, the
official receiver made an application in the winding up under IA, s.236 for orders seeking the
production of documents by two firms of solicitors and a firm of accountants that had acted for the
company during its trading life. The official receiver conceded that his only purpose in applying for the
orders was to obtain evidence for use by the Secretary of State in the pending disqualification
proceedings. Nonetheless, his case throughout was that the court could allow him recourse to s.236
to enable him to discharge his statutory functions, including his functions under s.7 of the CDDA.
The Court of Appeal's decision
The district judge made the orders as asked but was overturned on the appeal of one of the directors
in the High Court. The Court of Appeal dismissed the official receiver's appeal against the judge's
decision, holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to make orders under s.236 solely for the
purposes of disqualification proceedings. Chadwick L.J. gave the judgment of the court and advanced
two reasons for the conclusion that the court had no power to make the orders:
First, in a case where the company was not being wound up by the court, the applicant in
disqualification proceedings could only be the Secretary of State and, it was significant that the
Secretary of State did not have standing to make an application under IA, s.236. The powers
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conferred by IA, ss.235-236 could not have been conferred to enable the Secretary of State to obtain
indirectly information and documents that Parliament had not thought it necessary or appropriate to
enable him to obtain directly. Moreover, there was no reason to think that Parliament intended that
the powers to obtain information and documents for use in disqualification proceedings should be any
greater in a case where the company was being wound up the court in England and Wales than in a
case where the company was in voluntary liquidation. (The essence of this reasoning lies in the
difference of approach to compulsory and voluntary liquidation. Given that the Secretary of State,
through lack of standing, cannot invoke s.236 to gather information for use in disqualification
proceedings against directors of a company that has gone into voluntary liquidation, why should the
official receiver be allowed to invoke the provision for the purposes of disqualification proceedings
against directors of a company that has gone into compulsory liquidation?).
Secondly, in a case where the company is being wound up by the court in England and Wales, the
official receiver is under a statutory duty to investigate the company's affairs and the causes of its
failure and, should he think fit, to make a report to the court (IA, s.132). By giving the official receiver
standing to invoke IA, ss.235-236, Parliament intended only that he should be able to use those
provisions for the purpose of discharging that function. It may well be that he will obtain information in
discharging his function under IA, s.132 that can be used in making a report to the Secretary of State
under CDDA, s.7(3)(a) or, in disqualification proceedings, should he be directed to bring them under
CDDA, s.7(1)(b). However, the official receiver cannot have been intended to invoke the powers in IA,
ss.235-236 either for the purpose of discharging his reporting obligation under CDDA, s.7(3) or for the
purpose of obtaining evidence for use in disqualification proceedings brought in his name under
CDDA, s.7(1)(b) save in so far as those purposes are incidental to his function under IA, s.132. The
reason for this lay in CDDA, s.7(4) which provides that:
“The Secretary of State or the official receiver may require the liquidator, administrator or
administrative receiver of a company, or the former liquidator, administrator or administrative receiver
of a company--(a) to furnish him with such information with respect to any person's conduct as a
director of the company, and (b) to produce and permit inspection of such books, papers and other
records relevant to that person's conduct as such a director, as the Secretary of State or the official
receiver may reasonably require for the purpose of determining whether to exercise, or of exercising,
any function of his under this section”.
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proceedings, this would render CDDA, s.7(4) otiose: any information or documents required by the
official receiver could be obtained from the office holder under IA, ss.235-236 without the need to rely
on the specific information gathering power in the CDDA.
Two observations can be made about the Court of Appeal's decision. First, in its refusal to treat the
official receiver's reporting obligation under the CDDA as part and parcel of his overall statutory
functions under IA, s.132, the court took rather a narrow view of the official receiver's role. The
question of whether the other office holders who have standing could apply for an order under s.236
solely to gather information for the better discharge of their CDDA reporting obligations was not
expressly addressed. It should be noted, however, that the court could only have reached the same
conclusion on this question by taking a restricted view of the role of administrators, administrative
receivers and liquidators, effectively treating their statutory obligation to report directorial misconduct
under CDDA, s.7(3) as falling outside the functions of the particular office holder. Secondly, although
the scope of IA, s.236 is wider than CDDA, s.7(4) in terms of the persons who can be required to
provide information and/or produce documents, the court regarded the two provisions as mutually
exclusive rather than complementary.
The House of Lords' decision
A unanimous House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal's decision. All three of their lordships who
delivered judgments (Lords Millett, Hope and Walker--Lords Steyn and Hoffmann simply agreed with
the others) started from the premise that the Court of Appeal had taken too narrow a view of the
functions of office holders under the Insolvency Act. Thus, as Lord Millett pointed out, while the
gathering of evidence for use in disqualification proceedings is not strictly part of a liquidator's
functions in the winding up, “[t]he liquidator's functions in relation to the company which is being
wound up are not and never have been limited to the recovery and distribution of the company's
assets”.3 The law of winding up has always had a dual purpose: (1) to facilitate the collection and
realisation of the company's assets and the orderly settlement of its liabilities and (2) the investigation
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of the company's affairs and imposition in the public interest of criminal or civil sanctions on
wrongdoers, in particular, on company directors found to have abused the privilege of limited liability.4
Thus the office holder, whether he be a liquidator, administrator or receiver, has what may be termed
a “public interest” function in that the purposes of the particular insolvency regime must, by virtue of
CDDA, s.7(3), include the gathering of information to enable office holders to discharge their reporting
obligations.5 In the absence of any express limitation in the wording of s.236, it followed that office
holders must be able to invoke the provision solely with a view to discharging their CDDA reporting
obligations as these obligations form part of their overall functions.6 Lord Millett added that it would be
odd if the court could direct a public examination on the application of a liquidator of a company in
voluntary liquidation7 but, conversely, could not direct a private examination on the application of the
same party under s.236 in the wider public interest.8 On this premise, their lordships proceeded to
unpick the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, making the following additional points:
(1) Section 236(1) expressly authorises the official receiver to make an application under the
provision “whether or not he is the liquidator”. As the official receiver may expressly invoke s.236 after
he has ceased to be the company's liquidator, it followed that the provision could not only be available
to assist him in the collection and distribution of the assets. It must also be available to enable him to
carry out his wider investigative and reporting functions, including his functions under CDDA, s.7.9
(2) The fact that the Secretary of State could not make an application under s.236 did not lead to the
inference that Parliament intended that she should not have recourse to the section at all, even
indirectly. It has never been the function of the Secretary of State to conduct investigations or gather
information. These functions are delegated to others, namely the official receiver and other office
holders.10
(3) IA, s.236 and CDDA, s.7(4) are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.11 Moreover, CDDA,
s.7(4) was not rendered otiose for two reasons. First, it may be reasonable in a given case for an
office holder to refuse to invoke section 236 at the expense of the insolvent estate where the sole
purpose of the application is to assist the authorities in bringing or continuing disqualification
proceedings.12 Secondly, disqualification proceedings may concern the conduct of a director in
relation to more than one company: under CDDA, s.6(1) the issue of whether the defendant's conduct
makes him unfit can be assessed by reference to the insolvent company which has triggered the
court's jurisdiction together with his conduct “as a director of any other company or companies”.
Unless the other companies are also in compulsory liquidation, s.236 will not enable the official
receiver to obtain information in respect of them. However, such information could be obtained from
the relevant office holder under CDDA, s.7(4) assuming that the other companies are, or have been,
in voluntary liquidation, administration or administrative receivership.
There were also strong policy reasons supporting the conclusion reached. As Lord Millett put it:
“The consequences of the Court of Appeal's decision would be most unfortunate and cannot have
been intended by Parliament. Where the company had no assets worth recovering, neither the official
receiver nor the office holder would be able to invoke section 236 for the purpose of investigating the
conduct of the former directors, since this would not be incidental to ‘his functions in the winding up’
as the Court of Appeal conceived them to be. Serious misconduct would go undetected and the public
unprotected. Moreover applications under section 236 would be complicated by the need for detailed
consideration of the reasons for the application, and in particular whether the information was sought
for the benefit of creditors and contributories (and only incidentally for the purpose of disqualification
proceedings) or solely for the purpose of disqualification proceedings. Not only would this inevitably
delay the disqualification proceedings … but it would make the collection of the necessary *Comp.
Law. 92 evidence serendipitous and the protection of the public adventitious.”13
Comment
It is submitted that the House of Lords started from the correct premise. Insolvency law has both a
public and private face and the functions of office holders are clearly not confined to dealing with the
assets of the particular company (so, for example, a liquidator is also obliged by IA, s.218, within
defined parameters, to report possible criminal misconduct to the authorities). Similarly, the view that
IA, s.236 and CDDA, s.7(4) are complementary can be defended by reference to the settled principle
that the two Acts should be regarded as a single, unitary body of law.14 The immediate consequences
are as follows:
(1) The official receiver and office holders can have recourse to IA, s.236 with a view to the better
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discharge of their reporting obligations under CDDA, s.7(3).
(2) The official receiver can also have recourse to IA, s.236 with a view to gathering information for
use in disqualification proceedings brought by him under CDDA, s.7(1)(b).
The practical importance of the ruling for the official receiver is twofold. First, the category of persons
that can be required to give information or produce documents is wider under IA, s.236 than it is
under CDDA, s.7(4). The former extends to “any person whom the court thinks capable of giving
information concerning the promotion, formation, business, dealings, affairs or property of the
company” (s.236(3)(c)) whereas the latter is confined to current and former office holders. Secondly, it
would now be open to the official receiver to use s.236 to obtain information and documents from this
wide category of persons where proceedings are being contemplated, rather than having to issue the
proceedings and then obtain the material by means of a witness summons. Even so, it must be
remembered that the House of Lords ruling goes only to jurisdiction. The court may still decline to
make an order on the ground that to do so would be oppressive to the person concerned.15 For this
reason, it is likely that the official receiver will use s.236 sparingly and then only with a view to the
production of documents.
One question touched upon by the House of Lords, but not directly resolved, is whether the Secretary
of State or official receiver could compel office holders to seek a s.236 order for the purposes of
pending or contemplated disqualification proceedings through the mechanism of CDDA, s.7(4). The
writer has argued elsewhere that such compulsion is theoretically possible.16 Lord Millett was rather
more equivocal:
“Section 7(4) is not expressly limited to information and documents in the office holder's possession;
and I see no ground for implying such a limitation. I do not think that section 7(4) obliges the office
holder to invoke section 236 in order to obtain the information for which the Secretary of State has
asked: it may not be reasonable for him to do so at the expense of the estate. But section 7(4)
certainly does not forbid it; on the contrary, it brings the provision of such information to the Secretary
of State for the purpose of disqualification proceedings squarely within the function of the liquidator.”17
Clearly, it is now open to an office holder, in theory, to apply of his own volition for a s.236 order
solely for CDDA purposes. However, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which an office
holder will be prepared to make such an application voluntarily. As s.7(4) is not confined to
information and documents in the office holder's possession, it is submitted that there is no reason, in
principle, why the provision could not be used to pressurise an office holder into using s.236 as a
means of obtaining material from third parties that may assist the authorities. In granting the
Secretary of State or official receiver's application under s.7(4), the court would, no doubt, insist on
the provision of an indemnity in relation to the office holder's costs.
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